This paper investigates the adoption level of a network service where the net utility perceived by each user incorporates three key features, namely, user service affinity heterogeneity, a network externality, and a subscription cost. Services with network externality face a "chicken and egg" adoption problem in that the service requires customers in order to attract customers. In this paper we study cost subsidization as a means to "reach the knee" and thereby change the equilibrium adoption level from zero to one. By focusing on a simple subsidy structure and a simple model for user heterogeneity, we can derive explicit expressions for quantities of natural interest, such as the minimum subsidy required, the minimum subsidy duration, and the aggregate cost of the subsidy to the service provider. We show that small or large subsidies are inefficient, but that there is a Pareto efficient frontier for "intermediate" subsidies wherein subsidy duration and aggregate cost are in tension with one another.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the Internet fueling the rise of a "network society" [2] , many services and technologies 1 realize their value only after reaching a certain level of adoption. In other words, they exhibit positive externalities, e.g., Metcalfe's Law. Externalities are well-known [3] , [4] to affect adoption, and in particular to create a "chicken-and-egg" problem (i.e., a service requires customers in order to attract customers) that can often stymie the success of new services. This is because, when a new service is offered, most potential adopters see a cost that exceeds its (low) initial value. This barrier to entry has been used to explain the difficulties encountered by various Internet security protocols [5] as well as by new versions of the Internet itself, i.e., IPv6 [6], [7] . Understanding how to overcome this problem is vital to the success of future (network) services. Towards this end, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) held a workshop on Internet Technology Adoption and Transition (ITAT) in December, 2013 to "develop protocol deployment strategies that enable new features to rapidly gain a foothold and ultimately realize broad adoption. Such strategies must be informed by both operational and economic factors." 2 In our prior work [8] , [9] we investigated service bundling as a means of overcoming initial adoption inertia. In this work, S An earlier version of this work appeared at the 2014 Joint Workshop on Pricing and Incentives in Networks and Systems (W-PIN+NetEcon) [1] . 1 For conciseness we will use the term services to refer to both. 2 http://www.iab.org/activities/workshops/itat/ we analyze the service adoption dynamics (AD) under a standard diffusion model when the service provider employs cost subsidization. Our model incorporates three key assumptions: i) users are heterogeneous, i.e., their affinity for the service varies; ii) services exhibit positive network externalities, i.e., the utility perceived by a user is an increasing function of the service adoption level; and iii) services have a subscription cost, i.e., a user pays a fixed amount per unit time to participate in the service. There are no additional costs to initially join or leave the service, nor any contractual requirements that prevent a user from leaving the service at any time. Costs are assumed non-discriminatory, i.e., identical across users, and fixed (exogenous). This is in contrast to studies that endogenize costs to maximize an objective, e.g., revenue ( §II). Subsidization is a natural solution for such services because it incentivizes adoption among initial adopters ("innovators" [10] ), thereby allowing the adoption level to build up to the "knee", i.e., , the point at which the strength of the externality will incentivize the later adopters ("imitators"), and the subsidy will no longer be needed to sustain the service. Subsidization may take many forms; we provide a (necessarily) selective and brief review of this large topic in §II. In this paper we restrict our attention to perhaps the most natural and simple subsidy, namely, the constant level subsidy (CLS), wherein the service provider subsidizes the cost for each adopter at a constant level (per adopter) over a finite duration. Specifically, an (s, T ) CLS starting at time t 0 for a service with cost (per unit time) of c means that any adopter will pay at rate c − s at any time t ∈ [t 0 , t 0 + T ], and will pay at rate c for any time t > t 0 + T . It is natural that the subsidy duration T be selected so that the subsidy stops once adoption reaches some target level. A service provider employing a CLS will be interested in simultaneously minimizing two key performance metrics: i) the aggregate cost of the subsidy and ii) the required duration of the subsidy.
Our main result is Prop. 5, where we suppose the subsidy duration T to be chosen to guide the AD to the boundary of the domain of attraction of the full adoption equilibrium. We give the minimum subsidy amount required to actually change the equilibrium from zero to full, the AD as a function of the subsidy amount, and both the required subsidy duration and the aggregate cost of the subsidy to the service provider as a function of the subsidy amount. We show that the required subsidy duration is nonincreasing in the subsidy amount, and that the aggregate subsidy cost is initially decreasing in the subsidy amount, but then will eventually (for large enough subsidies) be increasing in the subsidy amount. These results illustrate that the two key performance metrics may or may not be in tension with one another, depending upon the specific choice of the model parameters.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. §II discusses related work and §III presents the mathematical model. §IV addresses AD for services without a network externality, while §V and §VI address AD for services with network externalities with and without cost subsidization, respectively. §VII offers a brief conclusion. Some proofs are found in the appendices.
II. RELATED WORK
There is a long-standing awareness of the role of subsidies in realizing more efficient outcomes in "markets" that exhibit positive externalities i.e., by demonstrating the benefits of Pigouvian subsidies [11] . For example, [12] examines the impact of early investments on a firm's growth rate in the telecommunication industry. It identifies that early investments can facilitate the creation of an initial user base, and lead to greater overall market share. This awareness not withstanding, most of the focus to-date has been on case studies, e.g., see [13] for a recent review.
There have been some recent efforts on the modeling front, stemming in part from interest in viral marketing in online (social) networks [14] - [17] . These works are closely related to studies of adoption dynamics in social networks [18, Chapter 24] , but with a focus on maximizing revenue rather than adoption. The optimal marketing strategy in a symmetric network, i.e., a product utility grows in proportion to its number of adopters, is investigated in [15] by formulating it as the solution of a dynamic program. A general network setting is considered in [14] with the important difference of considering a divisible good, so that consumption maximization is now the target.
Like [10] , we focus on product adoption among heterogeneous users in the presence of an externality, but our work differs in that [10] studies two classes with no adoption costs, and no subsidization. Like [3] , we focus on subsidies (sponsorship in their paper) with network externalities, but our work differs in that [3] looks at equilibrium pricing, whereas our interest is on adoption dynamics. Like [15] , we address optimizing over subsidies, but our work differs in that [15] considers buyer-specific subsidies and externalities.
III. MATHEMATICAL MODEL

A. Without cost subsidization
The basic model captures AD in a large population of potential users of a network service exhibiting the three assumptions in §I. Let x(t) = x(t|t 0 , x 0 ) ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of the population that has adopted the service at each time t ≥ t 0 subject to the initial condition x(t 0 ) = x 0 .
Assumption 1: The net utility, V = V (x), perceived by a randomly selected user when the adoption level is x, the cost is c, and the externality parameter is e is the random variable
The net utility, and each of the three terms comprising it, should be thought of as values or costs per unit time. Each of the three terms in (1) reflect one of the key assumptions in §I.
Assumption 2: User service affinity heterogeneity is captured by the random variable U with a continuous complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF)F U , denoted U ∼ F U . Affinities are independent and identically distributed (iid).
Assumption 3: The network service externality is captured by the utility term ex, where e ≥ 0 is the externality parameter.
The assumption that each user's perceived utility is linear in the adoption level is consistent with Metcalfe's Law. 3 Assumption 4: The cost of adoption is a constant c ≥ 0 in the net utility. Although one can define an equivalent model with U = U −c, capturing each user's "net affinity", we retain c to facilitate investigation of cost subsidization.
Assumption 5: The adoption level follows standard diffusion dynamics [20] , with time-scale parameter γ > 0:
The dynamics in (2) assert the rate of change of the adoption level is proportional to the difference between the fraction of the population that would adopt at adoption level x(t) (in light of (1)), and the fraction of the population that has adopted, i.e., x(t). The initial (t = t 0 ) adoption level is denoted x(t 0 ) ≡ x 0 . Equilibria and stability are defined in the natural way:
B. With cost subsidization
A subsidy s > 0 is a reduction of the cost c so that the net utility (1) under the subsidy is V = U + ex − (c − s). It is natural to consider subsidies that depend upon time (s(t)), the adoption level (s(x)), or both (s(t, x)).
Definition 2: The (normalized) cost of the subsidy to the service provider is
where the AD x(t) are affected by the subsidy s(t, x(t)).
In this paper we focus on a simple but natural subsidy. Definition 3: The constant level subsidy (CLS) with param-
AD under CLS are denoted y(t) = y(t|t 0 , y 0 ) to distinguish from unsubsidized AD x(t). The subsidized net utility is
and the subsidized AD (with initial condition y(t 0 ) ≡ y 0 ) are: where y(t) is the solution to (6). initial time x 0 = y 0 initial adoption level without and with subsidization x(t|t 0 , x 0 ) adoption level without subsidization y(t|t 0 , y 0 )
net utility without and with subsidization U ∼ F U random user service affinity e ≥ 0 network externality coefficient c ≥ 0 adoption cost (per unit time) γ time-scale parameter for AD X (X ) set of (stable) adoption equilibria s, T CLS subsidy amount, duration S(s, T ) total cost of subsidy to provider Uni(um, u M ) uniformly distributed affinities x • (c) unique equilibrium in (0, 1) under uniform affinities IV. ADOPTION DYNAMICS AND EQUILIBRIA WITHOUT
EXTERNALITIES
In this section we study the impact of subsidization in the absence of a network externality (e = 0). In contrast with §V and §VI where F U is assumed uniform, in this section we make no assumption about the affinity distribution F U beyond the continuity in Assumption 2.
A. Without subsidization
With no externality and no subsidization (s = 0), the net
There is a unique (stable) equilibrium X =X = {F U (c)}, and x(t) →F U (c) as t → ∞ for all (t 0 , x 0 ).
B. With constant level subsidy (CLS)
With no externality, if the subsidy level s(t) only depends upon time t and not on the adoption level y (but is otherwise arbitrary), then the AD becomeẏ(t) = γ(F U (c(t)) − y(t)), for c(t) = c − s(t). This inhomogeneous first-order ordinary differential equation may be solved via integrating factors:
If we assume the subsidy s(t) is a CLS then more can be said.
Proposition 1: Assume no externality (e = 0) and fix s(t) to be a CLS (4) with parameters (s, T ). The following seven statements hold. i) The AD (6) are y(t|t 0 ,
iii) The subsidy duration T (s, y) required to reach a target adoption level y with subsidy level s is
which is positive provided y 0 < y <F U (c−s) orF U (c−s) < y < y 0 . iv) The cost S(s, T (s, y)) (7) for a subsidy with duration T (s, y) follows by substitution of (12) into (11):
v) For any s ∈ [0, c] and T < ∞, the unique stable equilibrium adoption level isX = {F U (c)}. vi) For any target y > y 0 , the subsidy duration T (s, y) is nonincreasing in the subsidy amount s, i.e., d ds T (s, y) ≤ 0. vii) For any target y,
i.e., the LHS is a sufficient condition for the subsidy cost S(s, T (s, y)) to be decreasing in the subsidy amount s.
The subsidization cost (11) follows from substituting c(t) = c and y(t) in (10) into (3). iii): The subsidization duration (12) follows by equating (10) with y and solving for T . iv): The subsidy cost (13) follows by substituting T (s, y) (12) in (7) and simplifying. v) The (stable) equilibrium property is immediate from Def. 1 and the dynamics (10) 
(15) vii) The proof of (14) is in App. A.
If affinities are uniformly distributed (U ∼ Uni(u m , u M )), then the results in Prop. 1 may be extended as follows. Recall T (s, y) (12) is the subsidy duration required to reach a target adoption level y with subsidy level s.
Corollary 1: Under the assumptions of Prop. 1 and uniform affinities, the following hold.
Example 1: To illustrate Cor. 1, fix e = 0, t 0 = y 0 = 0, γ = 1. In the absence of an externality, the resulting unique (stable) equilibriumX = {F U (c)} means that any finite-time subsidy cannot alter the final equilibrium level. In the presence of a network externality, however, the final equilibrium level may (in some cases) be alterable by a finite-term subsidy, which suggests subsidies are of mathematical interest primarily for services with externalities. With this justification, the rest of the paper investigates AD with network externalities -first without ( §V) and then with ( §VI) cost subsidization.
V. ADOPTION DYNAMICS AND EQUILIBRIA WITHOUT COST
SUBSIDIZATION
We now turn to our main focus in this paper -services exhibiting a network externality. In this section, we seek to i) characterize the set of equilibria X and stable equilibriā X , and ii) explicitly solve the AD x(t) in (2) in the absence of any cost subsidization. In the interest of providing explicit expressions, we hereafter assume the following.
Assumption 6: The i.i.d. user service affinities are uniformly distributed, U ∼ Uni[u m , u M ], for u m < u M . The following notation will be employed. First, let
denote the unique equilibrium in (0, 1) of (2) under uniform affinities (see Prop. 2). Next, let
and 
as the time durations required for the dynamics in (18) 
All equilibria are stable, aside from x • (c) when u M ≤ c ≤ u m + e (case 3). The AD, denoted x(t|t 0 , x 0 ), are given by (66) through (69), where the subscripts 1 through 4 correspond to the four equilibrium cases in (21). The proof is found in App. B. Fig. 2 shows (21) . The four cases each imply a range for
Remark 1: The unstable equilibrium x • (c) (16) in case 3 is the boundary between the domains of attraction of the two stable equilibria, 0 and 1, i.e.,
Remark 2: The AD admit a natural interpretation: Case 1): X = {0}. If c ≥ u M + e then for all x 0 the convergence rate to 0 depends solely on γ. The same is true if
then the dynamics consist of two parts: first x(t|t 0 , x 0 ) decays likex(t|t 0 , x 0 , c) for t ∈ [t 0 , t 0 +T M (x 0 |c)), then x(t|t 0 , x 0 ) again converges to 0 at a rate that depends solely on γ for t ∈ [t 0 +T M (x 0 |c), ∞). 
). After this time, x(t|t 0 , x 0 , c) converges to 0 or 1, respectively, at a rate that depends solely on γ. Significantly, as cases 1, 2, and 4 have only one equilibrium, there is no possibility for a finite-duration subsidy to change the equilibrium adoption level. By contrast, such a change is possible under case 3 (whereX = {0, 1}) provided the initial adoption level x 0 lies below the boundary x • (c) between the two domains of attraction. As such, in the following section we focus on this case.
VI. ADOPTION DYNAMICS WITH COST SUBSIDIZATION
We now study AD under cost subsidization in the presence of a network externality when the service affinity distribution is uniform (Ass. 6). Consistent with the remarks at the end of §V, we focus on the case where subsidies may be used to positive effect. Recall the subsidized AD (6) are denoted y(t) with Assumption 8: The initial adoption level y 0 = y(t 0 ) is such that the stable equilibrium without subsidization is zero, i.e., 0 ≤ y 0 < x • (c) ≤ 1. Prop. 3 shows the AD under a CLS are (trivially) expressed in terms of the unsubsidized AD, but is otherwise not insightful. We consider two specific cases to gain more insight into CLS. First, §VI-A studies full cost subsidization, i.e., s = c, as a function of the duration T . Second, §VI-B studies minimum duration subsidization, i.e., T =T (s) (72), where the duration is selected to bring the adoption level to the boundary x • (c) between the domains of attraction of the stable equilibria (Remark 1), with the subsidy level s a free parameter.
A. Full cost subsidization
Under CLS with full cost subsidization (s = c), the subsidized AD (t ∈ [t 0 , t 0 + T ]) areẏ(t) = γ(1 − y(t)) (since each user has a positive net utility) with solution
DefineT
as the duration T such that y(t 0 + T |t 0 , y 0 ) = x • (c), and i) The subsidized (t 0 ≤ t ≤ t 0 + T ) AD are given by (25). The unsubsidized (t > t 0 + T ) AD are given by (70), for T M =T M (y(t 0 + T )|c) in (19) ,T m =T m (y(t 0 + T )|c) in (20) , andx in (17) .
ii) The cost of the subsidy (7) is S(T ) 
which are "evenly spaced" around thresholdsT M ,T • ,T m :
T 7 0 0.177 0.785 1.156 1.277 1.824 3.041
(32) Fig. 3 shows the AD for these seven durations T . Subsidies with durations below (above)T • (y 0 ) converge to 0 (1), respectively.
B. Minum duration subsidization
We now consider the case of a general subsidy level s with a subsidy duration T =T (s) (72) chosen to ensure that the adoption level at the end of the subsidy is the minimum required for the unsubsidized dynamics to converge to 1, i.e., Remark 1) . In what follows, we refer to the ratio s/e as the normalized subsidy. Proposition 5: Let Assumptions 6 (uniform affinities), 7 (multiple stable equilibria), and 8 (initial adoption level) hold. The following seven statements hold under a CLS s(t) (4) with s ∈ [0, c] and minimum required duration T =T (s) (72).
i) The minimum normalized subsidy s/e required to change the equilibrium from 0 to 1 iŝ
meaning for s e ≤ŝ e the subsidized AD will still converge to 0, while for s e >ŝ e the subsidized AD will converge to 1. 
.
(37) which imply the following orderings, respectively: In particular, for large s the cost increases without decreasing the duration, hence these points are inefficient, while for small s the cost again increases as does the duration, and thus such points are also inefficient. There is a critical interval for the subsidy s within which S(s) is decreasing whileT (s) is increasing only marginally from its minimum value; this interval represents the efficient frontier for the subsidy.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the use of cost subsidization as a means of increasing the adoption level of services exhibiting network externalities. Specializing the problem to the simple CLS subsidy and uniform user service affinities, we obtain explicit expressions for the AD, and two key performance indicators, namely, the aggregate cost of the subsidy to the service provider and the duration of the subsidy. We chose the subsidy duration to be as small as possible while still ensuring the subsidy will change the equilibrium from zero to full adoption. For this case, we demonstrated that an efficient service provider will not choose "small" or "large" subsidies, but that there is a Pareto efficient frontier for "intermediate" subsidies wherein the two performance metrics are in tension with one another. 
Observe d ds S(s) < 0 ifF < sf , which establishes (14) .
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROP. 2
Lemma 1: The differential equation (DE)ẋ(t) = γ(ax + b) (with x(t 0 ) = x 0 ) with a = 0 solution x a,b (t|t 0 , x 0 ) below.
The time t at which x(t) = x is given by t a,b (x|t 0 , x 0 ) below. The proof is trivial. Cor. 2 is immediate from Lem. 1. Corollary 2: The DEs below have the following solutions. i) a = −1, b = 0, i.e.,ẋ(t) = −γx:
x −1,0 (t|t 0 , x 0 ) = x 0 e −γ(t−t0) t −1,0 (x|t 0 , x 0 ) = t 0 − 1 γ log x x 0 (46)
ii) a = −1, b = 1, i.e.,ẋ(t) = γ(1 − x):
the solution is x(t) = xâ ,b (t|t 0 , x 0 ) in (17) 
